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Abstract
In this article, an enhanced version of address resolution protocol (ARP) is proposed to prevent ARP poisoning-
based man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks in wired or wireless LAN environments. The proposed mechanism is based
on the idea that when a node knows the correct MAC address for a given IP address, if it does not delete the
mapping while the machine is alive, then MITM attack is not possible for that IP address. In order to prevent MITM
attack even for a new IP address, we propose a new IP/MAC mapping conflict resolution mechanism based on
computational puzzle and voting. Our proposed scheme can efficiently mitigate ARP poisoning-based MITM
attacks, even in Wi-Fi hot-spots where wireless machines can easily come and leave, since the proposed
mechanism does not require manual configuration if the proposed ARP is deployed through operating system (OS)
upgrade. The proposed scheme is backward compatible with the existing ARP protocol and incrementally
deployable with benefits to the upgraded machines.
1 Introduction
The address resolution protocol (ARP) is used to find
the media access control (MAC) address of a node cor-
responding to a given IP address in the same subnet
[1,2]. The resolved addresses are temporarily kept in the
ARP cache to reduce the resolution time and avoid
additional ARP traffic overhead for recently resolved IP
addresses [3].
The ARP poisoning attack refers to the behavior of
registering a false (IP, MAC) address mapping in the
ARP cache of another node for malicious purposes. As
an example, when there are three different nodes A, B,
and C in the same subnet, if Node A registers the (IPC,
MACA) mapping in the ARP cache of Node B, then it is
an ARP poisoning attack of Node A. If the above attack
is successfully made, Node A can receive all the packets
from B to C because B considers that MACA is the
MAC address of Node C and sends all the traffic for C
to MACA. Thus, ARP poisoning enables the attacker to
eavesdrop the communication between other nodes,
modify the content of the packets, and hijack the con-
nection. This ARP poisoning can also be used to launch
a denial-of-service (DoS) attack [4]. For example, if an
attacker replaces the MAC address of a particular host
with another value in the ARP cache of a remote
machine, then the victim will experience DoS since it
cannot access the original host due to the wrong MAC
address. Furthermore, ARP poisoning can be used to
mount man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack [5]. In the
above example, if Node A registers the (IPB, MACA)
mapping in the ARP cache of node C additionally, then
Node A can see all the packets that are exchanged
between Nodes B and C. If this attack occurs, the adver-
sary may eavesdrop, insert, or modify the messages
between the victims of the MITM attack, without being
detected.
If an operating system accepts any ARP reply message
even though it did not send any ARP request messages,
then just one transmission of the ARP reply packet will
be enough to register a false (IP, MAC) mapping in the
node running that operating system. Even for operating
systems that do not accept unsolicited ARP reply pack-
ets, it is possible to induce an ARP request message for
a specific IP address by sending a spoofed ICMP echo
request packet and to register a false (IP, MAC) map-
ping for that IP address [6].
The ARP spoofing issue was first investigated in the
environment of wired local area network (LAN), i.e.,
Ethernet. However, it is becoming easier to access Inter-
net via wireless LAN, i.e., 802.11 network, due to the
widespread deployment of access points (APs) by many
* Correspondence: synam@ynu.ac.kr
Department of Information and Communication Engineering, Yeungnam
University, Gyeongsan-si, Gyeongbuk 712-749, Korea
Nam et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 2012, 2012:89
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2012/1/89
© 2012 Nam et al; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
Internet service providers (ISPs). Thus, ARP spoofing
can also be an important issue in the wireless LAN
environment. According to [7], there can be many sce-
narios whereby a wireless attacker poisons the ARP
caches of other wireless nodes, connected through the
same AP or different APs, or it poisons the ARP caches
of other wired nodes in the same subnet. Although
there have been several attempts to resolve the ARP
cache poisoning problem in the wired LAN environ-
ment, some of those approaches may not be effective in
a different environment of wireless LAN.
Conventional approaches can be classified into two
categories depending on whether the ethernet switch
upgrade is required or not. dynamic ARP inspection
(DAI) [8] requires the support from the ethernet
switches. DAI usually requires manual configuration by
network managers and cannot prevent ARP poisoning
occurring between wireless nodes connected through
the same AP. The methods that do not require support
from Ethernet switches usually use cryptographic techni-
ques [9,10]. Since most of these methods use public key
cryptography, there should be a central server to distri-
bute the public key of each node reliably. However, this
central server could be subject to a single point of fail-
ure problem.
Furthermore, the public key of the central server itself
and the MAC address of the server need to be delivered
to each node reliably. This step usually requires manual
setting by the network manager, and it may not be
appropriate for the environment of Wi-Fi hot-spots
where wireless machines can easily come and leave.
Thus, we investigate a new mechanism to prevent
ARP spoofing-based MITM attacks in wired or wireless
LAN environments, while overcoming the limitations of
existing approaches. The proposed scheme makes the
upgraded normal nodes protect each other through col-
laboration based on voting and computational puzzles.
Since the public key cryptography is not required, the
manual setup or configuration is not required for the
newly arriving wireless nodes and it is free from a single
point of failure problem due to the absence of any cen-
tral server. The remainder of the article is organized as
follows. We first discuss related study in Section 2. Sec-
tion 3 describes the proposed enhanced version of ARP.
In Section 4, the performance of the proposed mechan-
ism is verified through experiments in a testbed envir-
onment. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 5.
2 Related study
As explained in Section 1, neglecting unsolicited ARP
replies cannot prevent ARP cache poisoning, since ARP
requests can be easily induced by source address-
spoofed ICMP echo request messages. If the member
nodes of a given subnet do not change frequently, then
the ARP cache poisoning might be avoided by employ-
ing static ARP. However, this approach may be infeasi-
ble in an environment where the IP addresses are
allocated to mobile nodes dynamically through Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP). DAI corresponds
to the approach that requires the support of ethernet
switches [8]. In the DAI, the ethernet switch checks the
validity of the received ARP packet based on the trusted
IP-to-MAC mapping database. However, this database is
either manually managed or dynamically managed
through DHCP snooping [8]. In order to perform
DHCP snooping, the port on which the network DHCP
server is connected needs to be configured as a trusted
interface, and other ports need to be configured as
untrusted interfaces. However, this approach may not be
effective, if the ARP cache poisoning occurs among the
wireless nodes connected via the same AP. In this arti-
cle, we attempt to devise a method to prevent ARP poi-
soning-based MITM attacks with minimal overhead of
manual configuration by the network administrator or
by the user, and with minimal infrastructure upgrade
cost.
The approaches that do not require the upgrade of
ethernet switches can be classified into two sub-cate-
gories based on the use of cryptography. Antidote [11]
is a non-cryptographic approach. If a new ARP reply,
which is insisting on a new MAC address for an existing
IP address, arrives, the new (IP, MAC) mapping is
accepted, only when the node corresponding to the pre-
vious MAC address is not alive. However, there is a pro-
blem in Antidote. When a normal machine sends an
ARP request for an IP address which is not in the ARP
cache currently, if a malicious ARP reply arrives first,
then the victim caches the wrong reply and discards the
later ones. Thus, MITM attack can be successful under
this race condition. The proposed scheme shares the
basic concept, preservation of (IP, MAC) mapping while
the node corresponding to the original MAC address is
alive, with the Antidote, but resolves the race condition
in a different way using computational puzzle-based
voting.
S-ARP [9] is a popular cryptography-based approach.
Although S-ARP requests operate in the same way as
normal ARP requests, S-ARP replies need to be signed
by the sender’s private key and the signature needs to
be verified using the sender’s public key at the receiver
side. Since S-ARP is based on asymmetric cryptography,
it requires a central server called authoritative key distri-
butor (AKD) to manage the mapping between the IP
address and the corresponding public key. If the AKD
fails, the whole system may not work, i.e., S-ARP has a
single point of failure problem. In addition, S-ARP
usually requires the upgrade of the DHCP server and
incremental deployment is not easy, since the S-ARP-
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enabled machine may not accept ARP replies from non-
S-ARP nodes.
Goyal and Tripathy proposed a modified version of
ARP [6] to lower the computational cost of S-ARP. This
avoids the calculation of digital signature for each ARP
reply by allowing the use of the same digital signature
several times over multiple ARP replies during a pre-
defined time period, while ensuring the recency of the
mapping in the digital signature through one time pass-
words. Although the computational cost is relieved, it
has the same limitation as S-ARP: a single point of fail-
ure problem due to AKD, and the cost of manual con-
figuration to disseminate the public key and the MAC
address of AKD to all newly arriving hosts.
Ticket-based ARP (TARP) [10] is another approach to
reduce the computational cost of S-ARP by employing
the concept of ticket, centrally generated IP/MAC
address mapping attestation. However, TARP also
requires manual dissemination of Local Ticket Agent
(LTA)’s public key, and LTA might be subject to a sin-
gle point of failure problem.
Philip [12] proposed an approach to prevent ARP
cache poisoning in wireless LAN by implementing the
defense mechanism in the AP. The basic idea is as fol-
lows. The AP constructs the list of correct IP-to-MAC
address mapping by monitoring DHCP ACK messages
or referring to the DHCP leases file, and blocks all the
ARP packets with a false mapping based on the con-
structed list. However, this approach can be applied
only to the dynamic IP addresses allocated through
DHCP, and cannot prevent ARP cache poisoning occur-
ring inside the wired LAN. We attempt to protect the
upgraded nodes from ARP poisoning-based MITM
attacks, whether those nodes are connected to LAN
through wire or wireless medium.
Recently, Nam et al. [13] proposed an enhanced ver-
sion of ARP, called MR-ARP, to prevent ARP poison-
ing-based MITM attacks in the ethernet by employing
the concept of voting. If an ARP request or reply mes-
sage arrives declaring a new MAC address for an IP
address registered in the ARP cache, MR-ARP queries
the node corresponding to the current MAC address to
check if that IP address is still used by that node in a
similar way to Antidote. If an MR-ARP node receives an
ARP request or reply declaring an (IP, MAC) mapping
for a new IP address, it requests that the neighbor
nodes vote for the new IP address to make the correct
decision for the corresponding MAC address. For this
mechanism, the voting can be fair only when the voting
traffic rates of the responding nodes are almost the
same. This condition can be satisfied in the Ethernet,
but may not be valid in the 802.11 network due to the
traffic rate adaptation based on the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR), i.e., auto rate fallback (ARF) [14,15]. Thus, we
attempt to overcome the limitation of MR-ARP by
improving the voting procedure through the incorpora-
tion of computational puzzles, while achieving the fol-
lowing goals: mitigation of ARP poisoning-based MITM
attacks in wired or wireless LAN, backward compatibil-
ity with existing ARP, minimal infrastructure upgrade
cost (e.g., no upgrade of LAN switches or modification
of DHCP), incremental deployability, and no manual
configuration for newly joining nodes.
3 Computational puzzle-based enhanced ARP
We improve the voting procedure of MR-ARP by incor-
porating computational puzzles [16-18] to mitigate ARP
poisoning-based MITM attacks in wired or wireless
LAN, while overcoming the limitation of MR-ARP [13].
As explained at the end of Section 2, the transmission
rates of wireless nodes may not be uniform, and thus,
the fair voting may not be guaranteed by the voting
mechanism of existing MR-ARP. The key idea of the
new voting mechanism to resolve the fairness issue in
the wireless LAN can described as follows. If the CPU
processing power of different nodes is not significantly
different, then they might spend a similar amount of
time solving the puzzles of the same difficulty. Thus, if
we accept the votes only from the nodes that solved the
puzzle correctly, then fair voting might be realized in
the wireless environment, too. Furthermore, voting reply
traffic can be reduced compared to the original MR-
ARP scheme since we no longer need to receive multi-
ple votes from each neighbor node. In addition to the
fairness issue, MR-ARP could be vulnerable to ARP
cache-poisoning problem, although not the MITM pro-
blem, especially when a new machine with a new IP
address is added. We also explain how this issue is
resolved through the new initialization stage after the
detailed description of the new voting mechanism. The
proposed enhanced version of MR-ARP, which is called
EMR-ARP, follows a similar approach to the original
MR-ARP, except in the voting and initialization proce-
dures. Thus, EMR-ARP is also based on the following
idea [13]. When Node A knows the correct IP/MAC
address mapping for Node B, if Node A retains the
mapping while Node B is alive, then ARP poisoning and
the MITM attack between A and B are not possible.
EMR-ARP retains the long-term (IP, MAC) mapping
table, in addition to the normal ARP cache, which is
also referred to as the short-term table in this article, to
manage the (IP, MAC) mapping for all alive machines
in the subnet. Three fields, IP, MAC, and Timer TL, are
allocated for each IP address registered in the long-term
table. The default value of the timer in the long-term
table is 60 minutes. In order to avoid losing the map-
ping of (IPa, MACa) for an alive host after 60 minutes,
the EMR-ARP node sends new ARP request messages
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for IPa only to MACa through unicasting and checks
whether MACa is alive and is still using IPa just before
the timer expires. In this case, 10 ARP messages are
sent at the random intervals of 50~100 ms. If at least
one ARP reply returns, then the mapping is registered
in the short-term ARP cache and the corresponding
long-term table timer is set to 60 min again. If there is
no ARP reply, then the mapping between IPa and MACa
is considered invalid and the corresponding entry is
deleted from the long-term table. Thus, the (IP, MAC)
mapping can be retained in the long-term table until
the binding is released.
EMR-ARP inspects the mapping between the sender
protocol (IP) address and the sender hardware (MAC)
address of every incoming ARP request message to
track the IP/MAC mapping for all alive machines in the
same subnet, since each alive machine tends to send
ARP requests to find the MAC address of the gateway
router repeatedly due to the periodic timer expiry in the
ARP cache. However, IP/MAC mapping of every ARP
request cannot be directly reflected in the long-term
table due to the possibility of ARP cache poisoning
attempts. Thus, the short-term cache, i.e., ARP cache,
and long-term table need to be updated carefully on
arrival of ARP request or reply packets. Figure 1 shows
the detailed short-term cache and long-term table man-
agement policy. By the rule for the case (A) in Figure 1,
each IP/MAC mapping registered in short-term cache is
frozen until it expires, e.g., for 2 minutes for Windows
XP, to prevent too frequent cache updates by ARP
request sniffing.
In case (B) of Figure 1, MAC conflict occurs, because
the newly received MAC address MACa for IPa differs
from MAC′a that is already associated with IPa. This con-
flict is resolved by giving a priority to MAC′a only if it is
alive. As shown in Figure 1, the activity of a host is
examined by sending 10 ARP request packets and
counting the ARP replies. Multiple ARP requests are
sent to cope with unexpected packet losses, including
the case of DoS attack on MAC′a. Even though the
packet loss probability is as high as 80% by DoS attack,
at least one ARP reply will be returned with a probabil-
ity of 89%(= 1 - 0.810). Let us consider the case where
the mapping of (IPa, MACz) expires, and the IP address
IPa is allocated to a new machine with the MAC address
of MACa through DHCP. In this case, the new mapping
between IPa and MACa can be chosen by the rule corre-
sponding to the case (B) in Figure 1, even though the
mapping (IPa, MACz) exists in the long-term table.
When a first ARP request from MACa arrives, there
would be conflict on IPa in the long-term table, and the
node which observes the conflict will send ten ARP
requests to MACz. However, the machine MACz would
not reply and the new mapping can be registered, since
the previous mapping has expired.
/* (IP_a, MAC_a): the sender protocol (IP) and hardware (MAC)
                           addresses of the received ARP request or reply packet */
if(IP_a is registered in the short-term cache) { --- (A)
   no action; /* in case of conflict, preserve existing mapping.*/
}
else if((IP_a, MAC_a) is registered in the long-term table) {
   register (IP_a, MAC_a) in the short-term cache;
   set the long-term table timer to 60 minutes; 
}
else if(IP_a is in the long-term table, but the registered MAC is not MAC_a) { --- (B)
   /* conflict on IP and MAC mapping */
   send 10 ARP requests to existing MAC through unicasting 
      at random intervals with an average of 10 msec; 
   if(at least one ARP reply arrives)
      retain the existing (IP, MAC) mapping and drop the new one;
   else 
      accept the new mapping; 
   The accepted mapping is registered in the short-term cache, too. 
} 
else{ /*i.e. IP_a is not in short-term/long-term tables */ --- (C)
   send voting requests for IP_a; 
   if(no response)  
      the mapping (IP_a, MAC_a) is registered in both tables; 
   else if(there exists a MAC that polls over 50% of votes for IP_a) 
      that mapping is registered in both tables; 
} 
Figure 1 Short-term cache and long-term table update policy applied on the arrival of ARP request or reply packets.
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3.1 Computational puzzle-based voting scheme
Thus far, we investigated how to prevent MITM attacks
for the IP addresses whose corresponding MAC
addresses are known already. However, if Node A
receives an ARP request from a new IP address, then
Node A cannot easily know the correctness of the
source IP/MAC mapping contained in the ARP request.
For example, when a new machine is added into a LAN
with empty short-term cache and long-term table and
the machine sends an ARP request for the gateway rou-
ter, if an adversary’s ARP reply advertising a fake MAC
address arrives first, then this wrong MAC address may
be registered and the late true MAC address may be
dropped. We use computational puzzle-based voting,
which corresponds to the case (C) in Figure 1, to solve
the poisoning problem for this particular case.
The basic idea of the voting-based resolution mechan-
ism can be explained as follows. When Node A is
turned on with empty ARP cache and long-term table, if
the neighbor nodes that know the true MAC address of
the gateway router provide that information to Node A,
then Node A can make a correct decision on the MAC
address of the gateway router based on the majority of
the votes. Figure 2 describes a simplified outline of the
voting procedure with this example scenario. Since
Node A wants to know the true MAC address of the
gateway router, it first generates a new puzzle and
broadcasts the voting request message containing the
new puzzle to neighbor EMR-ARP nodes. Then, the
neighbor nodes solve the puzzle using the message
transformation function, and notify the voting request
node of the puzzle solution and the MAC address of the
gateway router that they know through voting reply
messages. After collecting the voting reply messages
from the neighbor nodes, Node A verifies the puzzle
solution using the message recovery function, and
makes a decision based on the votes from the nodes
providing the correct puzzle solution. The message
transformation function and the message recovery func-
tion will be described shortly in this section.
Preserving the fairness among different nodes is one
of the most important issues in the voting scheme. In
the previous version of the voting scheme used in MR-
ARP [13], the fairness was provided by having all the
neighbor MR-ARP nodes send multiple voting reply
packets at the maximum speed of link rate in the Ether-
net. This idea works, because the LAN cards usually
have sufficient capability to send traffic at the link rate
regardless of the vendor. However, the maximum trans-
mission rates of different nodes may not be the same in
the wireless LAN if the transmission rate changes by
ARF depending on SNR. Thus, the voting scheme needs
to be refined to provide the fairness under any combina-
tion of wireless and wired nodes. We attempt to provide
the fairness by having the wired or wireless nodes spend
a similar amount of time solving the computational puz-
zles [18] of the same difficulty and making the address


























Figure 2 Outline of the voting procedure.
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nodes that solved the puzzle correctly. Thus, the puzzle
used in the proposed ARP scheme needs to satisfy the
following requirements.
• The puzzle must be easy to make.
• The puzzle must be difficult to solve, but it should
be easier to verify the puzzle solution.
• Puzzle receiver nodes cannot predict the puzzle
easily.
• Different nodes should solve different problems to
avoid the case whereby a malicious node pretends to
be many other nodes by sending multiple replies
with a spoofed MAC address after solving only one
problem.
• The complexity of the different puzzles should be
similar to provide fairness between different nodes.
Conventional computational puzzles [16-18] based on
hash functions might satisfy most of the above require-
ments. However, we found very large variance in the
puzzle solving time for hash function-based puzzles. As
an example, let us consider the puzzle that finds the
value of x that satisfies the following relation:
[H′(x)]r = [y]r ,
where H’ is a uniform random hash function, r is a
positive integer, y is an integer given by the puzzle pre-
senter, and [z]r means the least significant r bits of z.
Then, the number of iterations required to find a solu-
tion of the above puzzle can be modeled as a random
variable X that has a geometric distribution with a suc-
cess probability p, where p = 1/(2r). The mean (μ) and
the standard deviation (s) of X are 1/p and
√
1 − p/p,
respectively. Thus, s can be large, even close to μ for
small values of p. When this type of puzzle is used, if
the attacker can luckily solve many puzzles, even for dif-
ferent MAC addresses, while most other normal
machines solve only one puzzle, then the attacker might
win the voting by increasing the ratio of votes support-
ing the fake MAC address and spoof the ARP cache of
the voting request node. The variance in the puzzle sol-
ving time needs to be minimized to avoid such a
problem.
In order to satisfy the above requirements, while
minimizing the variance in the puzzle-solving time, we
design the puzzle based on the public key cryptogra-
phy, especially RSA algorithm [19,20], so that the
number of arithmetic operations required to solve the
puzzle cannot differ depending on the machines. The
proposed puzzle can be described as follows. We first
consider two keys e and d that are usually termed the
public key and the private key in the public key cryp-
tography. In the proposed scheme, the value of e is
fixed to 3, a popular value for the public key [20]. We
calculate the value of d in the following way. We
choose two different large primes p and q, that are 128
bits long and satisfy the condition that (p - 1) and (q-
1) are relatively prime to e. Then, d is an integer that
satisfies the condition:
ed = 1 mod (p - 1)(q - 1). Such a value of d can be
easily found with Euclid’s algorithm [20]. N is defined as
N = pq, and N is 256 bits long. When e = 3, if the mes-
sage x is smaller than 3
√
N, then the encrypted message
x3 can be decrypted simply by taking a cube root. This
problem can be avoided by padding each message with
a random number before encryption, so that the padded
message is sufficiently large. We define the message
transformation functions fi(i = 1,..., m), and Fm as fol-
lows.
fi(x) = {(xd mod N) − 1 + i} mod (N − 1) + 1,
Fm(x) = fm(fm−1(· · · f1(x))),
(1)
If fi is simply defined as modular exponentiation, e.g.,
as the decryption operation in the public key cryptogra-
phy, without any additional operations of addition and
subtraction, then the multiple encryption required to
evaluate Fm(x) can be simplified into a single exponen-
tiation by Euler’s theorem [20]. In order to avoid such a
simplification, we incorporated the additional operations
of addition and subtraction in the definition of the mes-
sage transformation functions as shown above.
We also define the message recovery functions gi(i =
1,..., m), and Gm as follows.
gi(x) = {(x− 1 − i) mod (N − 1) + 1}e mod N,
Gm(x) = g1(g2(· · · gm(x))).
(2)
Then, from (1) and (2) we can obtain the following
relation.
gi(fi(x)) = {(fi(x) − 1 − i) mod (N − 1) + 1}e mod N,
= [{((xd mod N) − 1 + i) mod (N − 1) − i}
mod (N − 1) + 1]e mod N.
If we put y = (xd mod N)-1, then y belongs to [0, N -
2] and the above relation can be changed into
gi(fi(x)) = {y mod (N − 1) + 1}e mod N,
= (y + 1)e mod N,
= (xd mod N)e mod N,
= x,
where the last equality is valid by the RSA algorithm.
Similarly, we can show that
Gm(Fm(x)) = x, if x < N. (3)
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The proposed puzzle is to find the value of y that
satisfies the following relation for a given integer x,
y = Fm(x).
Thus, if the values of e, d, N, and m are fixed, then
the puzzle complexity in terms of the number of opera-
tions is also fixed. In the proposed scheme, the values of
e, d, and N are fixed as described below, and the com-
plexity of the puzzle is controlled only by m.
In EMR-ARP, we use two types of puzzles. The first
type of puzzle should be solved by the voting request
node itself to prevent a DoS attack that attempts to
exhaust the processing power of neighbor EMR-ARP
nodes by inducing continuous puzzle computation
through too frequent transmission of voting request
packets. The second type of puzzle needs to be solved
by the EMR-ARP nodes receiving the voting request
packets. This puzzle is used to provide the fairness
among different nodes in voting.
In the first-type puzzle, the voting request node first
makes a message ms by concatenating its own MAC
address (MACA) and the local time Ts measured in sec-
onds when the voting request node starts to calculate
the puzzle, i.e., ms = MACA||Ts, and transform ms into
cs by the message transformation function Fm. Then, the
voting request node sends Ts, m, and the transformed
message cs to the neighbor nodes. e, d, and N need not
be delivered since they are fixed and known to EMR-
ARP nodes in advance. The neighbor nodes apply the
message recovery function Gm to the received message
cs. If the recovered message agrees with MACA||Ts, then
it confirms that the sender solved the first-type puzzle
correctly and the receiver proceeds to solve the second-
type puzzle to send a valid vote in return.
The second puzzle can be described as follows. The
voting request node with the MAC address of MACA
generates the key parameter for the second puzzle P by
P = H(K ‖MACA‖ Ts), (4)
where H is a publicly-known cryptographic hash func-
tion, and MD5 is used for H in the current version. K is
the secret that is known only to the voting request
node. If the value of P is delivered to the neighbor
nodes additionally, then each receiver node generates a
message mr by mr = MACA||MACR||P, where MACR is
the MAC address of the receiver node. We make each
EMR-ARP node solve a puzzle that differs from those of
other nodes by including the MAC address of the recei-
ver inside the puzzle to prevent the reuse of the solu-
tion. mr is transformed by Fm into cr, and only the
transformed message cr is sent back to the voting
request node. The voting request node applies the
recovery function Gm to the received message cr, and
compares the recovered message with mr, whose com-
ponents are known to voting request node already. If cr
is correctly calculated, i.e., cr = Fm(mr), then the follow-
ing relation should hold by (3):
Gm(cr) = mr.
Thus, by comparing Gm(cr) and mr, we can verify the
correctness of each answer. We can easily find that the
second-type puzzle reflects all the requirements stated
above.
The implementation-related details are as follows.
Two more ARP packet types, voting request and voting
reply packets, are defined in the EMR-ARP in a similar
way to MR-ARP. The operation field is set to 20 and 21
for voting request and reply packets, respectively. Figure
3 shows the packet formats for voting request and reply
messages. As shown in the figure, the voting request
packet is defined by adding 4 more fields, (Ts, m, cs, P),
to the normal ARP request/response packet format, and
the voting reply packet is defined by adding just one
more field of cr.
Each EMR-ARP node maintains a table of (MAC
address of voting request node, Ts) pairs, called puzzle
history table, to prevent the flooding of the identical
puzzles. Ts is the puzzle generation time at the sender
node as described above. If an EMR-ARP machine
receives a voting request packet, then it first examines
the value of the Ts field. If the value of received Ts is
less than or equal to the value stored in the puzzle his-
tory table, then the received voting request message is
neglected since the puzzle is highly likely to be a repeti-
tion of an old one. After verifying the validity of Ts to
avoid the flooding of identical puzzles, the EMR-ARP
node investigates the correctness of the solution con-
tained in the field of cs. If the solution is correct, the
received voting request is considered valid, and the
received timestamp Ts is registered in the puzzle history
table, i.e., in the entry corresponding to the MAC
address of the current voting request node. Then, the
EMR-ARP node proceeds to solve the second-type puz-
zle to provide a feedback for the voting request.
After solving the second-type puzzle as described
above, the EMR-ARP node sends the MAC address cor-
responding to the queried IP address and the puzzle
solution to the voting request node through the fields of
target hardware address and cr, respectively, in the vot-
ing reply packet of Figure 3b.
Then, the voting request node receives and buffers the
incoming voting reply packets up to 1 s from the voting
request transmission time. The voting request node
finds the earliest voting reply packet, calculates the
response time t1, i.e., the period from the voting request
transmission time to the arrival time of the earliest
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voting reply packet, and discards the voting reply pack-
ets that arrive later than 2t1 since those late replies
might come from the malicious nodes actively solving
the puzzles multiple times even for different nodes to
increase the ratio of the votes supporting the fake IP/
MAC mapping. Then, the voting request node verifies
the correctness of the puzzle solution only for the not-
too-late replies and accepts the received IP/MAC map-
ping only when the solution for the second-type puzzle
is correct. The voting request node calculates the polling
score for each candidate MAC address. If a MAC exists
that received over 50% of valid votes, then that MAC
address is accepted for the queried IP address.
3.2 Initialization stage
The original MR-ARP scheme might be vulnerable espe-
cially when a new MR-ARP node is attached to a LAN
where an attacker resides. The detailed problem is
described with an example below. In this section, we
introduce an initialization stage for the proposed EMR-
ARP to overcome the shortcoming of the original MR-
ARP scheme especially for this case.
Figure 4 shows an example network topology to
describe the vulnerability of the original MR-ARP
scheme. In the figure, Nodes A, B, C, and D are MR-
ARP enabled nodes. Among them, D is a router con-
necting the given subnet to other subnets. We assume
that there is only one attacker, i.e., Node E, and Node F
is newly attached to the LAN. Let us assume that Node
F is also MR-ARP enabled and uses a new IP address
not known to other MR-ARP nodes. In this case, if the
new node sends an ARP request message querying the
MAC address of the router, then Node F might receive
a false IP/MAC mapping from Node E. However, the
correct MAC address can be resolved through the vot-
ing procedure since the number of MR-ARP nodes is
larger than that of the attackers.
In this scenario, existing MR-ARP nodes do not know
the IP address of Node F, and thus, each of them will
try to find the correct MAC address of Node F through
voting after waiting a random time between 0 and 100
ms [13]. If we assume Node D is the first node that
queries the MAC address of Node F, Node D will send
a voting request for the IP address of Node F, IPF.
There are one attacker node, i.e., Node E, and only one
MR-ARP node that knows the MAC address for IPF, i.e.,
Node F itself. If those two nodes receive the voting
request for IPF, then Node F will reply with 50 voting
reply packets containing the correct MAC address for
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Figure 3 Voting request and reply packet formats for EMR-
ARP. (a) Voting request packet format, (b) Voting reply packet
format.
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Figure 4 Example network topology to illustrate one problem
of the original MR-ARP that happens when a new MR-ARP
node is attached.
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IPF. The attacking node needs not follow the original
MR-ARP protocol, and it can send more than 50 voting
reply packets with a false IP/MAC mapping. Thus, the
attacker can win the voting in this case.
MITM attack cannot be successful between Nodes D
and F even in this case since the ARP cache and the
long term table of Node F are protected with the help
of other MR-ARP nodes. However, we further investi-
gate how to prevent ARP cache poisoning-based one-
way eavesdropping by Node E for the packets going
from the router Node D to the new Node F.
We employ additional initialization steps for EMR-
ARP, which are described hereafter, to resolve this pro-
blem. The initialization procedure is performed only
once during the lifetime of a given machine. The life-
time means the time interval from the time when the
machine is turned on to the time when the machine is
turned off. If a given EMR-ARP machine receives a new
IP address through DHCP, then it performs the initiali-
zation steps, immediately after the IP address is config-
ured. If the IP address is manually configured for a
given EMR-ARP machine, then the initialization steps
are performed just after the network card is activated.
We need to note that all the ARP packets irrelevant to
the initialization steps are discarded until the initializa-
tion steps are completed.
The initialization stage consists of two steps. In the
first step, the rebooted or newly attached node adver-
tises its own IP/MAC mapping through a gratuitous
ARP request packet [21]. Each EMR-ARP node that
receives the gratuitous ARP packet checks whether it
knows the source IP address of the received packet. If it
knows the received IP address, then it resolves the con-
flict in the usual way, by asking the previous owner of
that IP address and giving it a priority. If the EMR-ARP
node does not know the received IP address, then it just
neglects the received gratuitous packet. Figure 5 sum-
marizes the task that is performed by the EMR-ARP
node receiving a gratuitous ARP request packet. This
packet is sent first to update the IP/MAC mapping for
the given IP easily, without the burden of voting espe-
cially when the owner of a given IP address changes
legitimately through DHCP.
The second step starts after waiting 1 s from the
transmission of the gratuitous ARP request packet. In
the second step, the rebooted or newly attached node
sends a special voting request packet for its own IP
address to know if its current IP address is used by
other machines. If there is no voting reply packet, or the
MAC address of voting node polls over 50% of votes,
then the new node can use the current IP address with-
out any problem. If there is at least one reply packet
and the MAC address of voting request node polls less
than 50%, then the node gives up the use of the current
IP address and requests a new IP address through
DHCP or manual configuration with the help of a net-
work administrator.
If other existing EMR-ARP nodes retain an entry cor-
responding to the IP address of the voting request node
in the long term table, then they first verify the correct-
ness of the solution to the first-type puzzle and send
voting reply packets after solving the second-type puz-
zle, only if the first puzzle solution is correct. Although
the voting reply packets for a normal voting request
message are sent only to the voting request node
through unicasting, the voting reply packets for a special
voting request message are broadcasted, so that other
neighbor EMR-ARP nodes can sniff those responses.
If an existing EMR-ARP node does not know the IP
address of the voting request node, then the node tem-
porarily stores the sender protocol and sender hardware
address mapping of the received ARP voting request
/* (IP_a, MAC_a): the sender protocol (IP) and hardware (MAC)
                          addresses of the received gratuitous ARP request packet */
if((IP_a, MAC_a) is registered in the long-term table) {
   register (IP_a, MAC_a) in the short-term cache; 
   set the long-term table timer to 60 minutes; 
}
else if(IP_a is in the long-term table, but the registered MAC is not MAC_a) { 
   /* conflict on IP and MAC mapping */ 
   send 10 ARP requests to existing MAC through unicasting 
      at random intervals with an average of 10 msec; 
   if(at least one ARP reply arrives)
      retain the existing (IP, MAC) mapping and drop the new one;
   else 
      accept the new mapping; 
   The accepted mapping is registered in the short-term cache, too. 
} 
Figure 5 Short-term cache and long-term table update policy applied on the arrival of gratuitous ARP request packets.
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packet. The neighbor EMR-ARP node ignorant of the IP
address of the node sending a special voting request
packet monitors the reply packets from other EMR-ARP
nodes for an interval of 1 sec. If there is no ARP voting
reply during that time interval, then the neighbor EMR-
ARP node accepts the sender protocol and sender hard-
ware address mapping of the special voting request
packet into the ARP cache and the long term table.
However, the mapping is not accepted, if there is any
voting reply packet. Figure 6 summarizes the way in
which EMR-ARP nodes process a special voting request
message that is querying the MAC address for the IP
address of the voting request node.
Thus, according to the initialization procedure
described above, when an EMR-ARP node sends the
first special voting request packet after reboot or initial
deployment, if an attacker replies with a false MAC
address for the queried IP address, then the new node
will try to avoid the use of the IP address in conflict.
Thus, the voting replies from the attackers advertising
false IP/MAC mapping cannot help one-way eavesdrop-
ping for the packets going to the new EMR-ARP node.
Conversely, if there is no reply for the first special vot-
ing request, then all the normal EMR-ARP nodes will
accept the mapping between the sender protocol address
and the sender hardware address of the special voting
request packet by the algorithm in Figure 6. Thus, the
proposed initialization procedure can effectively prevent
one-way eavesdropping of the packets destined to the
newly attached nodes.
4 Numerical results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed ARP in terms of the voting traffic overhead, the
reliability in the presence of attackers, and address con-
flict resolution delay.
4.1 Analysis of traffic overhead
We first compare the traffic overhead of EMR-ARP with
that of MR-ARP. The traffic overhead of EMR-ARP or
MR-ARP is due to the exchange of voting request and
reply packets in the voting procedure. Thus, we investi-
gate the traffic rate of voting request and reply packets.
We consider an example case with several assump-
tions to simplify the analysis. We assume that IP
addresses are allocated through DHCP for all nodes in
the same subnet, the IP lease time is fixed to TD, and a
limited set of IP addresses are reused through DHCP
with a minimal duration of IP address reassignment so
that once an IP address is registered in the long-term
table, it is not evicted from the table. We assume that
short-term and long-term tables of a given machine are
cleared when a new IP address is assigned to that
machine to consider a situation with high voting traffic
overhead. We also assume that there is no attacker in
the subnet to focus on the traffic overhead under nor-
mal conditions. We first analyze the traffic overhead for
MR-ARP. Let L and M denote the total number of alive
machines and the total number of alive MR-ARP
machines in the LAN, respectively. When machine A
restarts with an empty short-term Cache and long-term
table, Node A attempts to find the MAC addresses cor-
responding to the observed IP addresses through the
voting procedure described in [13]. When Node A sends
a voting request packet for IP address IPB, the average
rate of the voting reply traffic to Node A becomes (M -
1) × 50 × 28 × 8/TD = 11.2(M - 1)/TD Kbps. Thus, the
aggregate voting reply rate to Node A, rMR - ARPA , becomes
/* (IP_a, MAC_a): the sender protocol (IP) and hardware (MAC) 
                             addresses of the received voting request packet,
    IP_g: the target protocol (IP) address of the received packet */
if(IP_g is registered in the long-term table) {
   check the correctness of the first puzzle solution;
   solve the second puzzle and reply by broadcasting the MAC address
      for IP_g only when the first puzzle solution is correct;
}
else {
   temporarily store the mapping of (IP_a, MAC_a),
      and monitor voting replies from other EMR-ARP nodes for 1 sec;
   if(no reply for 1 sec)
      accept the mapping of (IP_a, MAC_a) into short and long term tables;
   else
      drop the mapping;
}
Figure 6 Handling of the received special voting request packet whose sender protocol (IP) address is equal to the target protocol
(IP) address.
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11.2(L - 1)(M - 1)/TD Kbps. Similarly, the aggregate vot-
ing request rate to Node A can be expressed as (M - 1)
× (L - 1) × 28 × 8/TD. Thus, the average voting traffic
rate to Node A can be expressed as











We now analyze the traffic overhead for EMR-ARP
nodes under the same assumptions. Although both MR-
ARP and EMR-ARP use the voting request and reply
packets, the detailed formats of these packets differ.
MR-ARP reuses the packet format of ARP request or
reply messages for the voting request and reply mes-
sages without any modification. However, the voting
request and reply packet formats in EMR-ARP are
defined by adding a few additional fields, (Ts, m, cs, P)
for the voting request packet and cr for the voting reply
packet, to the packet format of ARP request/reply mes-
sage. In the current implementation, the sizes of these
additional fields are set as follows: Ts is 4 bytes, m is 4
bytes, cs is 32 bytes, P is 16 bytes, and cr is 32 bytes.
Thus, the sizes of the voting request and reply packets
are 84 and 60 bytes, respectively, in EMR-ARP, which
are larger than 28 bytes in MR-ARP. Other major differ-
ences between EMR-ARP and MR-ARP are as follows.
Normal MR-ARP node responds to a single voting
request packet by sending 50 voting reply messages, but
a benign EMR-ARP node replies with a single voting
reply message. Under the above assumptions, the voting
traffic rate to EMR-ARP Node A, rEMR - ARPA , can be
expressed as
rEMR - ARPA = L× (M− 1) × 60 × 8/TD
+ (M− 1) × L× 84 × 8/TD
+ (M− 1) × (M− 2) × 60 × 8/TD
=




where the first term on the right hand side of the first
equality describes the rate of the voting reply packets
triggered by Node A itself, the second term describes
the traffic rate of voting request packets received by
Node A, and the third term is the rate of the voting
reply packets triggered by the special voting request
messages of other EMR-ARP nodes.
By comparing (5) and (6), we can find that the voting
traffic overhead of EMR-ARP is lower than that of MR-
ARP if L ≥ 2. If L ≥ 10, then the voting traffic overhead
of EMR-ARP is lower than that of MR-ARP by a factor
of more than six since the EMR-ARP does not require
multiple transmission of the same voting reply packets.
When L = M = 255, and TD is one day,
rEMR - ARPA = 1.22Kbps.. Thus, the voting traffic overhead
is not significant for a small subnet.
4.2 Analysis of reliability of the proposed scheme
Before investigating the reliability of the proposed
scheme in the presence of attackers in detail, we first
investigate whether the fairness can be maintained even
when the performance of the CPUs is not the same
among different machines.
We implemented the proposed EMR-ARP mechanism
on a 2.66 GHz quad-core PC by modifying the ARP-
related code of Fedora 9 Linux (kernel 2.6.25). As
explained in Section 3.1, each puzzle is solved by apply-
ing the message transformation function Fm to a given
message, and the puzzle solution is verified by applying
the message recovery function Gm to a given trans-
formed message. Among the message transformation
function-related parameters, e is fixed to 3 as explained
already. The values of N and d are selected once,
according to the rule described in Section 3.1 under the
constraint that N and d are 256 bits long, and the
selected values of N, d, and e are stored in the ARP ker-
nel code, so that they can be shared between different
machines by just installing the same or consistent ver-
sion of OS. Figure 7 compares the message transforma-
tion time and the message recovery time, i.e., the puzzle
solving time and the puzzle solution verification time,
for various values of iteration number m. Since the puz-
zle solving time increases linearly with respect to m, we
can control the complexity of the puzzle by m. We can
also observe that it takes a much longer time to solve a
puzzle than to verify the given puzzle solution. In Figure
7, the message transform time is larger than the mes-
sage recovery time by a factor of about 20. This ratio
can be increased further if we increase the bit length of
N, since the bit length of d should increase accordingly,
while e is fixed to 3. However, if the size of N increases,
then the sizes of field cs in the voting request message
and field cr in the voting reply message should also
increase, yielding higher voting traffic overhead. We fix
the size of N to 256 bits to keep the voting traffic over-
head small.
We also determine the value of m based on the result
shown in Figure 7. The message transformation time, i.
e., puzzle solving time, should be sufficiently longer
than the MAC layer access delay of 802.11 wireless
LAN so that the different transmission rate on the
wired and wireless medium cannot impair the fairness
in voting among the wired and wireless nodes [22].
Thus, we select a sufficiently large value, i.e., 4000, for
m to maintain the message transformation time over
450 ms. However, since the optimal value of m can
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differ depending on the machine, the value of m can be
determined according to the above rule by each
machine whenever it is rebooted.
Next, we investigate whether the fairness in voting can
be maintained even when multiple machines with differ-
ent CPUs are involved in the same voting process. Fig-
ure 8 compares the message transformation times
obtained from the three machines with different CPUs,
i.e., 3 GHz Pentium D, 2.33 GHz Core2duo, and 2.66
GHz Core2quad processors, respectively. The quad-core
processor yields the shortest computation time, and the
Pentium processor gives the longest computation time.
The dotted line in Figure 8 represents an upper bound
corresponding to two times the average message trans-
formation time of the quad-core machine. We can
observe that the ratio of the maximum computation
time to the minimum computation time is less than 2.
The standard deviation of the computation time was
measured to be less than 1% of the mean value in all
the cases.
As an example, let us consider a case where the pro-
cessors of all the machines belonging to the given sub-
net are one of the above three types of CPUs. Let us
assume that the puzzle solving times of different
machines do not differ by a factor of two, as shown in
Figure 8. Then, even though an attacker uses the quad-
core processor and tries to send multiple voting replies
after solving many puzzles for other MAC addresses, so
as to pretend to be multiple other machines, the first
voting replies from other normal EMR-ARP nodes will
arrive earlier than the second voting reply of the mali-
cious node if all the nodes experience a similar level of
MAC layer access delay. If t1 denotes the response time
of the earliest voting reply packet, then the voting
request node does not accept the voting reply packets
that do not arrive within 2t1 from the voting request
transmission time as explained in Section 3.1. Thus, the
fairness can be guaranteed if the puzzle solving times of
different machines do not differ by a factor of two. Fig-
ure 8 implies that this condition is likely to be valid in a
real environment since the performance of the CPUs
used in recent desktop and laptop computers is usually
not much different from that of the three types of CPUs
considered in this article.
We now investigate how well the proposed EMR-ARP
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Figure 7 Comparison of message transformation time (by Fm(x)) and message recovery time (by Gm(x)) for various values of m.
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attack nodes exist. In more detail, we compare the pro-
posed EMR-ARP scheme with MR-ARP [13] in terms of
the false decision probability in the presence of attack-
ers. Since we assume that all the malicious nodes col-
lude to raise the ratio of the votes supporting a selected
fake MAC address, false decision is made when the
aggregate number of votes from the adversaries exceeds
50% of the total valid votes. Figure 9 shows the network
topology for the test-bed to evaluate both MR-ARP and
EMR-ARP. There are seven MR-ARP or EMR-ARP
nodes, denoted Ni (i = 1,2,...,7). Among them, five nodes
from N1 to N5 are connected to the subnet through
802.11g wireless link. The remaining two nodes N6 and
N7 are connected to the LAN through Ethernet switch.
Although we use simple a linux machine for N6, we
assume that N6 plays the role of a gateway router, and
thus, each newly attached node tries to resolve the
MAC address of N6 first. In our experiment scenario,
N7 is newly attached. We focus on the voting procedure
that is triggered by N7 to resolve the MAC address of
N6. Although five adversary nodes, Ai (i = 1, 2,...,5), are
shown in Figure 9, the number of attackers is changed
from one to five depending on the experiment scenarios.
We connected the adversary nodes to the LAN through
a 100 Mbps ethernet switch to consider the situation
where the attackers are in a more advantageous position
than the normal MR-ARP or EMR-ARP nodes in terms
of the transmission speed. In addition, we used the
machines with a better CPU performance for attackers
to test the worst case under the given condition. In
more detail, we used five quad-core machines for attack-
ers, one pentium-D machine for the gateway router, one
quad-core machine for the new node, i.e., voting request
node, and three dual-core and two quad-core machines
for other MR-ARP or EMR-ARP nodes.
Figure 10 compares the false decision probability
obtained by EMR-ARP with that obtained by MR-ARP
for various numbers of adversary nodes under the con-
dition described above. We performed 50 experiments
for each number of adversary nodes. We can observe
that the MR-ARP suffers from very high false decision
probability, even when the number of adversary node is
only one, i.e., lower than the total number of MR-ARP
nodes participating in the voting, six. The reason can be
explained as follows. There are five wireless MR-ARP
nodes. However, the voting reply packets from those
wireless machines always arrive very late compared to

























Figure 8 Comparison of message transformation times, i.e., puzzle solving times, among the machines with different types of CPUs
(m = 4000).
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delay of at least tens of milliseconds. Although there are
one wired MR-ARP node and one wired adversary node,
the attacker can send more than 50 reply packets while
the MR-ARP node replies with only 50 reply messages.
Thus, a single attacker can always win the voting in case
of MR-ARP. In contrast, the false decision probability is
maintained very low in case of EMR-ARP since the suf-
ficiently long puzzle computation time resolves the
unfairness issue caused by unbalanced transmission
rates or MAC-layer access delay in wired and wireless
network. Thus, EMR-ARP can effectively protect the
upgraded nodes, as long as the number of the EMR-
ARP nodes is larger than that of the adversary nodes,
when the CPU performance of the normal EMR-ARP
machines and the attacker machines does not signifi-
cantly differ.
We briefly discuss the compatibility of EMR-ARP with
the existing ARP. EMR-ARP Node A responds to a nor-
mal ARP request destined to itself by sending an ARP
reply message as the current ARP. Even though Node A
is the only EMR-ARP-enabled node in the subnet, Node
A can accept the received IP/MAC mapping for a new
IP address using the rule for (C) in Figure 1. Thus,
EMR-ARP is backward compatible with the existing
ARP.
4.3 Analysis of conflict resolution delay
In this section, we investigate how long it takes to
resolve the conflict on IP/MAC address mapping espe-
cially in the cases (B) and (C) of Figure 1. In case (B) of
Figure 1, the conflict is resolved by sending 10 ARP
request packets to the previous owner of the IP address
in question and receiving an ARP response packet from
that node. Since the puzzle computation is not involved
in this step and the packets are hardly dropped in the
normal situation without any DoS attack, it usually
takes only one round-trip time (RTT) between the
querying node and the previous owner node to resolve
the conflict in this case. Since the querying node waits
up to 1 s, the conflict resolution time does not exceed 1
s even though there is no response from the previous
owner node.
In case (C) of Figure 1, the voting request node needs
to perform the following tasks to make a decision on
the owner of the IP address in question. The voting
request node first generates a first-type puzzle, solves it,
generates a key for the second-type puzzle, broadcasts a
voting request packet containing the solution for the
first-type puzzle and the key for the second-type puzzle,
waits for the voting reply messages from the neighbor
nodes only up to 1 s as described in Section 3.1, verifies
the solutions for the second-type puzzle, and makes a
decision based on the votes from the nodes providing
the correct solutions. Thus, the total conflict resolution
time W can be expressed as
W = Wp1 gen +Wp1 sol +Wp2 gen +Wwait +Wv +Wd,
where Wp1_gen is the first-type puzzle generation time,
Wp1_sol is the duration of the time interval to solve the
first-type puzzle, Wp2_gen is the second-type puzzle gen-
eration time, Wwait is the waiting time for the voting
reply messages, i.e., 1 s, Wv is the time to verify the
solutions for the second-type puzzles, and Wd is the
time to make a decision based on the valid votes. As
described in Section 3.1, the first-type puzzle is gener-
ated by simply concatenating its own MAC address and
the local time, and the key for the second-type puzzle is















Figure 9 Test-bed network topology to evaluate MR-ARP and the proposed EMR-ARP.
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a single hash function operation as described in (4).
Thus, the three components, Wp1_gen, Wp2_gen, and Wd,
are negligibly small compared with other components,
and the above expression for W can be simplified to
W  Wp1 sol + 1 s + Wv.
Wp1_sol is usually around 450 ms since the value of the
puzzle-related parameter m is selected to maintain
Wp1_sol close to 450 ms as explained in the previous sec-
tion. The puzzle solution verification time is much
shorter than the puzzle solving time as explained in the
section. Thus, Wv is usually smaller than Wp1_sol, but
Wv increases linearly with the number of received voting
reply messages. We performed experiment to investigate
the trend of W as the number of EMR-ARP nodes
increases. Figure 11 shows the range of the voting pro-
cedure delay (W), i.e., [μ - s, μ + s], where μ and s are
the mean and the standard deviation of W obtained
after 20 experiments for each number of neighbor
EMR-ARP nodes. We can observe that the voting proce-
dure delay W increases slowly from 1.5 s as the number
of the neighbor EMR-ARP nodes increases. The
increasing trend is due to Wv, that is proportional to the
number of the received voting reply messages. However,
since the voting request node waits for the voting reply
messages only up to 1 s from the transmission time of
the voting request packet, the number of voting reply
packets received during a 1 s interval is likely to be lim-
ited due to highly variable MAC layer access delay and
diverse computation power of the neighbor nodes in a
real environment, and the correct decision can be made
as long as the votes from the normal EMR-ARP nodes
outnumber the valid votes from the adversary nodes.
Thus, W is highly likely to saturate to a similar level
even though the number of EMR-ARP nodes increases
further.
5 Conclusions and future work
An enhanced version ARP, EMR-ARP, is proposed to
prevent ARP cache poisoning-based MITM attacks in
wired or wireless LAN environments. The proposed
scheme is based on two key concepts: long-term IP/
MAC mapping table and computational puzzle-based
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Figure 10 Comparison of false decision probabilities of EMR-ARP and MR-ARP for various numbers of adversary nodes when the
number of EMR-ARP/MR-ARP nodes is 6.
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address mappings for all alive machines in the subnet
from the ARP cache poisoning attack. The computa-
tional puzzle-based voting prevents ARP poisoning-
based MITM attack whenever a machine is rebooted or
a new machine is added. It is very important to main-
tain the fairness between different machines when the
MAC addresses are resolved based on voting. We
designed a new puzzle based on the RSA algorithm to
provide fairness, even when the link rates differ between
wireless and wired nodes, while minimizing the variance
in puzzle solving time.
The experiment results show that the ARP poisoning-
based MITM attacks are well mitigated, as long as the
number of EMR-ARP nodes is larger than that of adver-
sary nodes. Since the proposed mechanism is not based
on public-key cryptography, the manual configuration,
such as distribution of the public key and the MAC
address of the centralized key management server, is not
required, and thus, the proposed scheme can efficiently
mitigate ARP poisoning-based MITM attacks, even in
public Wi-Fi hot-spots. The proposed scheme is back-
ward compatible with existing ARP protocol and
incrementally deployable, with benefits to the upgraded
machines.
The proposed computational puzzle-based voting
scheme can provide fairness among different nodes only
when the computation power of the CPUs of those
machines is not significantly different. The proposed
scheme will be extended further, so that the fairness can
be maintained, even when the computation power of
the machines is more diverse in future study.
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